
| People's Republic of China | Republic of China |
Cross-Strait relations refers to the relations between mainland China, which sits to the west of the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan, which sits to the east; especially the relations between their respective governments, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC).
In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in the Communists' (CPC) favour, the ROC government led by the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taipei, in Taiwan, while the CPC proclaimed the PRC government in Beijing.
Since then, the relations between mainland China and Taiwan have been characterised by non-contact and animosity. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the legitimate government of all China. More recently, the legal and political status of Taiwan have become more controversial, with the expression of Taiwan independence sentiments in Taiwan which were formerly outlawed. At the same time, there has been increasing non-governmental and semi-governmental exchanges between the two sides. In 2008, negotiations are scheduled to restore some or all of the "three links" (transportation, commerce, and communications) between the two sides, cut off since 1949. Party-to-party talks between the CPC and the KMT have resumed and semi-official negotiations through organisations representing the interests of their respective governments are being scheduled.
The politically correct term "cross-Strait relations" has been adopted by the two sides concerned and many observers so that the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan would not be referred as "China-Taiwan relations" or "PRC-ROC relations". The former term implies the exclusion of Taiwan from China, and is considered non-neutral. The latter term implies the co-existence of the two governments as states, and does not reflect the official positions of either government. There is also no commonly used Chinese language term equivalent to the latter two terms.
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The early history of cross-strait relations involved the exchange of cultures, people, and technology.[1][2][3] However, no Chinese dynasty formally incorporated Taiwan in ancient times.[4] In the 16th and 17th centuries, Taiwan caught the attention of first Portuguese, then Dutch and Spanish explorers. In 1624, the Dutch established their first settlement in Taiwan. In 1662, Zheng Chenggong, a Ming-loyalist, defeated the Dutch rulers of Taiwan and took the island, establishing the first formally Han Chinese regime in Taiwan. Zheng's heirs used Taiwan as a base for launching raids into mainland China against the Manchu Qing Dynasty. However, they were defeated in 1683 by Qing forces. The following year, Taiwan was incorporated into Fujian province. Over the next two centuries, the Imperial government paid little attention to Taiwan.
The situation changed in the 19th century, with other powers increasingly eyeing Taiwan for its strategic location and resources. In response, the administration began to implement a modernisation drive. In 1885, the Imperial government raised Taiwan to a province. Within 10 years, Taiwan had become one of the most modern provinces in the Empire. However, the fall of the Qing outpaced the development of Taiwan, and in 1895, following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial government ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. Qing loyalists briefly resisted the Japanese rule under the banner of the "Republic of Taiwan", but order was quickly established by Japanese authorities.
Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945. During this time, Taiwan, as part of the Japanese Empire, was a foreign jurisdiction in relation to first the Qing Empire, and, after 1912, the ROC. In 1945, Japan was defeated in World War II, and surrendered its forces in Taiwan to the ROC, then ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT). The period of post-war Kuomintang rule over China (1945-1949) was marked in Taiwan by conflicts between local residents and the new KMT authority, most violently in the 228 Incident, which occurred on February 28, 1947. The seeds for the Taiwan autonomy and independence movement was sown in this time. During this time and in subsequent periods, the Taiwan autonomy and independence movement was allied with the CPC in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's KMT-led government in the ROC. Indeed, one such organisation, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, remains one of the eight official minor parties in mainland China.
China was soon engulfed in full scale civil war. In 1949, the war turned decisively against the KMT and in favour of the CPC. On October 1, 1949, the CPC proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing. The ROC government retreated, eventually declaring Taipei its temporary capital in December 1949.
Initially, the position of the United States, who was Chiang's most important ally, was to abandon Chiang and attempt co-operation with the Communists. When the Korean War began, however, this policy was reversed, and the United States committed itself to securing Chiang's remaining territory against Communist takeover. However, the United States never gave full support to Chiang's ambition to retake mainland China.
Diplomatically during this period, until around 1971, the ROC government continued to be recognised as the legitimate government of all China by most NATO governments. The PRC government was recognised by Soviet Bloc countries, members of the non-aligned movement, and some Western nations such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of China, and labelled the other as illegitimate. Civil war propaganda permeated the education curriculum. Each side portrayed the people of the other as living in hell-like misery. In official media, each side called the other "bandits". The ROC also suppressed expressions of support for Taiwanese identity or Taiwan Independence.
The two governments continued in a state of war until 1979. During the Korean War, some captured Communist Chinese soldiers, many of whom were originally KMT soldiers, were repatriated to Taiwan rather than mainland China. A KMT guerrilla force continued to operate cross-border raids into south-western China in the early 1950s. The ROC government launched a number of air bombing raids into key coastal cities of mainland China such as Shanghai. The PRC government launched several island offensives, such as taking Dachen islands in 1955. After the 1950s, the "war" became more symbolic than real, represented by on again, off again artillery bombardment towards and from Kinmen. In later years, live shells were replaced with propaganda sheets. The bombardment finally ceased in 1979 after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States.
During this period, movement of people and goods virtually ceased between PRC- and ROC-controlled territories. There were occasional defectors. One high profile defector was Justin Yifu Lin, who swam across the Kinmen strait to mainland China and is now Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank.
In 1978, the ROC government began to allow visits to mainland China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their family in mainland China for decades. This also proved a catalyst for the thawing of relations between the two sides. Problems engendered by increased contact necessitated a mechanism for regular negotiations.
In order to effect negotiations with mainland China on operational issues without compromising the government's position on denying the other side's legitimacy, the ROC government under Chiang Ching-kuo created the "Straits Exchange Foundation" (SEF), a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by the Mainland Affairs Council, an instrument of the Executive Yuan. The PRC responded to this initiative by setting up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), directly led by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. This system, described as "white gloves", allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies.
Led by highly respected elder statesmen Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, the two organisations began a series of talks that culminated in the 1992 meetings, which, together with subsequent correspondence, established the 1992 Consensus, under which both sides agreed to deliberate ambiguity on questions of sovereignty, in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides.
Also during this time, however, the rhetoric of ROC President Lee Tung-hui began to turn further towards Taiwan independence. Prior to the 1990s, the ROC had been a one-party authoritarian state committed to eventual reunification with mainland China. However with democratic reforms the attitudes of the general public began to influence policy in Taiwan. As a result, the ROC government shifted away from its commitment to the one China policy and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan. Lee's mainland China counterpart, Jiang Zemin, was also unwilling to compromise. Jiang notoriously attempted to influence the 1996 ROC election in Taiwan by conducting a missile exercise designed to intimidate Taiwanese voters and interfere with international shipping, leading to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. By 1998, semi-official talks had broken down.
Chen Shui-bian was elected President of the ROC in 2000. Politically, Chen is pro-Taiwan independence. Chen's repudiation of the 1992 Consensus combined with the PRC's insistence that the ROC agree to a "one China" principle for negotiations to occur prevented improvement in cross-strait relations.
Hu Jintao became President of the PRC in 2003, though he was ruling de facto as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since late 2002.
Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the 1992 consensus while Hu continued to insist that talks can only proceed under an agreement of the "one China" principle. Chen Shui-bian and his party continued to express an ultimate goal of Taiwanese independence, and make statements on the political status of Taiwan that the PRC considers provocative. At the same time, Hu and the PRC continued a military missile buildup across the strait from Taiwan while making threats of military action against Taiwan should it declare independence or if PRC considers that all possibilities for a peaceful reunification are completely exhausted. Mainland China also continued applying diplomatic pressure to other nations to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.[5]
After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed the previous blanket no-contact policy, a holdover from the Jiang Zemin administration. Under the new policy, on the one hand, the PRC government continued a no-contact policy towards Chen Shui-bian. It maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress, formalising "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.
On the other hand, the PRC administration loosened its rhetoric in relation to Taiwan, and pursued contact with apolitical, or politically non-independence leaning, groups in Taiwan. In his May 17 Statement in 2004, Hu Jintao made friendly overtures to Taiwan on resuming negotiations for the "three links", reducing misunderstandings, and increasing consultation. In the Anti-Secession Law passed in 2005, the PRC government for the first time authoritatively committed to negotiations on the basis of equal status between the two sides, and further refrained from imposing the "one China" policy as a precondition for talks. The CPC increased contacts on a party-to-party basis with the KMT, then the opposition party in Taiwan. Despite having been the warring parties in the Chinese Civil War, the CPC and the KMT also had a history of co-operation, when the two parties twice co-operated in the Northern Expedition and the war against Japan. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China, including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005.[6][7]
On March 20, 2008, the KMT party won the presidency in Taiwan. It also has a majority in the Legislature. Compared to his predecessors, who often dictated conditions to Taiwan, Hu has been proactive in seeking ties with Taiwan on the basis of the "One China Policy", especially with the pro-unification Kuomintang party.[8]
A series of historical meetings between the two sides have followed. On April 12, 2008, Hu Jintao held a historic meeting with ROC's then vice-president elect Vincent Siew as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia. On May 28, 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CPC and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should recommence semi-official dialogue under the 1992 consensus. Wu committed the KMT against Taiwanese independence, but also stressed that a "Taiwan identity" did not equate to "Taiwanese independence". Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to discussing Taiwan's wish to participate in the World Health Organization.
Both Hu and his new counterpart Ma Ying-jeou agree that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On March 26, 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the US President George W. Bush, in which he explained that the "1992 Consensus" sees "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".[9] The first priority for the SEF-ARATS meeting will be opening of the three links, especially direct flights between mainland China and Taiwan.
These events suggest a policy by the two sides to rely on the deliberate ambiguity of the 1992 Consensus to avoid difficulties arising from asserting sovereignty. As Wu Po-hsiung put it during a press conference in his 2008 mainland China visit, "we do not refer to the 'Republic of China' so long as the other side does not refer to the 'People's Republic of China'". Since the March elections in Taiwan, the PRC government has not mentioned the "one China policy" in any official announcements. The only exception has been one brief aberration in a press release by the Ministry of Commerce, which described Vincent Siew as agreeing to the "1992 consensus and the "one China policy". Upon an immediate protest from Siew, the PRC side retracted the press release and issued apologetic statements emphasising that only press releases published by the Xinhua News Agency represented the official PRC position. The official press release on this event did not mention the One China Policy.[10]
Ma Ying-jeou, the current ROC President, has advocated that cross-strait relations should shift from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-denial".[11]
Dialogue through semi-official organisations (the SEF and the ARATS) reopened on June 12, 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Neither the PRC nor the ROC recognizes the other side as a legitimate entity, so the dialogue was in the name of contacts between the SEF and the ARATS instead of the two governments, though most participants were actually officials in PRC or ROC governments. Chen Yunlin, President of the ARATS, and Chiang Pin-kung, President of the SEF, signed files on June 13, agreeing that direct flights between the two sides would begin on July 4[12] and that Taiwan would allow entrance of up to 3000 visitors from mainland China every day.[13]
On 2 September 2008 the ROC President Ma Jing-jeou was interviewed by the Mexico based newspaper Sol de Mexico and he was asked about his views on the subject of 'two Chinas' and if there is a solution for the sovereignty issues between the two. The ROC President replied that the relations are neither between two Chinas nor two states. It is a special relationship. Further, he stated that the sovereignty issues between the two cannot be resolved at present, but he quoted the '1992 Consensus', currently accepted by both sides, as a temporary measure until a solution becomes available.[14] The spokesman for the ROC Presidential Office Wang Yu-chi (traditional Chinese: 王郁琦) later elaborated the President's statement and said that the relations are between two regions of one country, based on the ROC Constitutional position, the Statute Governing the Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area and the '1992 Consensus'.[15] On 7 October 2008 Ma Ying-jeou was interviewed by a Japan based magazine "World". He said that laws relating to international relations cannot be applied regarding the relations between Taiwan and mainland China, as they are parts of a state.[16][17][18]
Semi-governmental contact is maintained through the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Negotiations between the SEF and the ARATS resumed on 11 June 2008.[19]
Although formally privately constituted bodies, the SEF and the ARATS are both directly led by the Executive Government of each side: the SEF by the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan of the ROC, and the ARATS by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC. The heads of the two bodies, Chiang Pin-kung and Chen Yunlin, are both full time appointees and do not hold other government positions. However, both are senior members of their respective political parties (Kuomintang and Communist Party of China respectively), and both have previously served as senior members of their respective governments. Their deputies, who in practice are responsible for the substantive negotiations, are concurrently senior members of their respective governments. For the June 2008 negotiations, the main negotiators, who are deputy heads of the SEF and the ARATS respectively, are concurrently deputy heads of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office respectively.
A series of meetings were held between the SEF and the ARATS at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing from 11 June 2008 to 14 June 2008. By convention, SEF-ARATS negotiations proceed in three rounds: a technical round led by negotiators seconded from the relevant government departments, a draft round led by deputy heads of the two organisations, and a formal round led by the heads of the two organisations. In this case, however, both sides have already reached broad consensus on these issues on both the technical and political levels through previous negotiations via the non-governmental and inter-party channels. As a result, the initial technical round was dispensed with, and the negotiations began with the second, draft round.[19]
The two sides agreed to the following:
The Chinese Mainland side agreed to open the following five cities as destinations: Beijing, Shanghai (Pudong), Guangzhou, Xiamen and Nanjing. Mainland China shall open Chengdu, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Dalian, Guilin, Shenzhen and other destinations later on and other cities if so demanded by the market.
The Taiwan Area side agreed to open the following eight cities as destinations: Taoyuan, Kaohsiung (Siaogang), Taichung (Chingchunkang), Taipei (Sungshan), Penghu (Makung), Hualien, Kinmen and Taitung[20].
To facilitate the above, both sides also agreed to exchange representative offices, with an SEF office to be opened in Beijing and an ARATS office in Taipei to issue travel permits to cross-Strait visitors, among other duties.
Following an invitation issued by the SEF at the first meeting, the heard of ARATS, Chen Yunlin, began a visit to Taiwan on 3 November 2008.[22]. Items on the agena raised by SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung included direct maritime shipping, chartered cargo flights, direct postal service, and co-operation in ensuring food safety, in response to the 2008 Chinese milk scandal[23], while ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin raised the matters of direct freight service, and opening up air routes that directly cross the Taiwan Strait. Previous routes avoided crossing the STrait for security reasons, with planes detouring through Hong Kong or Japanese air control areas.[24]
On 4 November 2008, ARATS and SEF signed a number of agreements in Taipei. The agreement relating to direct passenger flights increased the number of charter flights from 36 to 108 per week, operating daily instead of the four days a week previously. Flights would now operate to and from 21 mainland Chinese cities. Flights would also take a more direct route. Private business jet flights would also be allowed. The agreement relating to cargo shipping allowed direct shipping between 11 sea ports in Taiwan and 63 in mainland China. The shipping would be tax free. The agreement relating to cargo flights provided for up to 60 direct cargo flights per month. Finally, an agreement was made to set up food safety alerts between the two sides. [25]
The stand-off between demonstrators and police lasted six hours. Cindy Sui had observed that ever since the melamine milk products(from mainland) had hospitalised a number of Tawainese, protests against President Ma's pro-China policies were on the increase. Most of the mass protests were organized by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)[26]
The fact that mainland China official refused to address Ma Ying-jeou as "President" had "angered many of the hundreds of protesters who gathered in the streets around the meeting venue, blowing air horns and scuffling with riot police armed with shields."[27]
On November 6, 2008, Edward Wong of The New York Times reported:
| “ | Mr. Chen did not address Mr. Ma as zongtong — president. Doing so would have implied that the mainland recognizes Taiwan’s de facto independent status. The question of how Mr. Chen would address Mr. Ma was much discussed by political analysts in the mainland and Taiwan before Mr. Chen arrived in Taipei on Monday for the start of his five-day visit, and pro-nationalist Taiwanese were irate on Thursday after learning that Mr. Chen avoided using Mr. Ma’s formal title.[28] | ” |
On 6 November 2008 William Foreman of Associated Press interviewed Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party:
| “ | People feel anxious especially when we have to wonder whether the president, Taiwan's democratically elected president, will be addressed as president...If he (Ma Ying-jeou) cannot even defend his own title, what can he defend for us? | ” |
The polls in two of Taiwan's biggest newspapers after the visit reported that the public was pleased with Chen's visit, with about 50% of the Taiwanese public considered Chen's visit having a positive effect on Taiwan's development, while 18 to 26% of the respondents thought the effect would be negative.[29] In another poll, it suggested that 26% of the respondents were satisfied with the DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen's handling of the crowds in the series of protests, while 53% of the respondents were unsatisfied. The same poll also showed that 33% of the respondents were satisfied with President Ma's performance at his meeting with Chen Yunlin, while 32% of the respondents were not satisfied.[30] According to a telephone poll conducted by Taiwan's top-selling Apple Daily newspaper on 7 November 2008 on the subject of a series of anti-Chen protests organised by the DPP, 62.12% of the respondents considered it bad for DPP's image, describing it as a "violent party", 31.13% of the respondents considered it good for the DPP's image, as it demonstrated Taiwan's democracy, while 6.75% of the respondents did not express an opinion.[31]
The (current) ruling parties of the two sides, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, maintain regular dialogue via the "KMT-CPC Forum". This has been called a "second rail" in Taiwan, and helps to maintain political understanding and aims for political consensus between the two sides.
A third mode of contact is through private bodies accredited by the respective governments to negotiate on technical and operational aspects of issues between the two sides. Called the "Macau mode", this avenue of contact was maintained even through the years of the Chen Shui-bian administration. For example, on the issues of opening Taiwan to mainland Chinese tourists, the accredited bodies were tourism industry representative bodies from both sides.
Regular weekend direct,cross-strait charter flights between mainland China and Taiwan resumed on July 4, 2008 for the first time since 1950. Liu Shaoyong, China Southern Airlines chair, piloted the first flight from Guangzhou to Taipei airport. Simultaneously, a Taiwan-based China Airlines flight flew to Shanghai. Five mainland Chinese cities will be connected with eight Taiwan airports. The flights will operate four days a week (Friday to Monday), totalling 36 round-trip flights across the Taiwan Strait. Previously, regular passengers (other than festive or emergency charters) had to make a time-consuming stopover at a third destination, usually Hong Kong.[32][33] Under the current procedure, the flights do not directly cross the Taiwan Strait for security reasons, but instead must enter the Hong Kong air control area before moving into or out of mainland China or Taiwan airspace.
Taiwan residents cannot use the Republic of China passport to travel to mainland China, as neither the ROC nor the PRC considers this international travel. A Taiwan Compatriot Pass is the document Taiwan residents must show to enter the Chinese Mainland.
Cross-strait investments have greatly increased in recent years. Predominantly, this involves Taiwan-based firms moving to, or collaborating in joint ventures, in mainland China. The collective body of Taiwanese investors in mainland China is now a significant economic force for both the mainland China and Taiwan.
Inter-marriage between the two sides have increased in recent years. The majority of such cases involve a female partner from mainland China marrying a male partner from Taiwan, with the couple eventually settling in Taiwan.
Cultural exchanges have increased in frequency. The National Palace Museum in Taipei and the Palace Museum in Beijing have collaborated on exhibitions. Scholars and academics frequently visit institutions on the other side. Books published on each side are regularly re-published in the other side, though restrictions on direct imports and the different orthography between the two sides somewhat impede the exchange of books and ideas.
Students of Taiwan origin receive special concessions in the National Higher Education Entrance Examination in mainland China. There are regular programs for school students from each side to visit the other.
Religious exchange has become frequent. Frequent interactions occur between worshippers of Matsu, and also between Buddhists.
The PRC and the ROC have provided humanitarian aid to each other on several occasions. Most recently, following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, an expert search and rescue team was sent from Taiwan to help rescue survivors in Sichuan. Shipments of aid material was also provided under the co-ordination of the Red Cross Society of The Republic of China and charities such as Tzu Chi.
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